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Natural Goodness, Philippa Foot. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. pp. 125. ISBN# 0-19-823508-9
Philippa Foot’s most recent book, Natural Goodness, is so gracefully written that the reader runs the risk
of only just wetting her or his feet, mistaking the book’s fluidity for shallowness. In fact, the depth of
Foot’s concerns in this slim volume—seven brief chapters comprise only 125 pages—is remarkable. In
the introduction and the first chapter, Foot attempts to escape the grip of non-cognitivism and to reorient
our understanding of practical rationality. This is by itself no small job, but it serves primarily as a
preliminary for Foot’s central project in the second and third chapters where she invigorates a neo-
Aristotelian teleology and virtue ethics, providing an account she calls natural normativity. Chapter four
elaborates upon Foot’s view of practical rationality by addressing the skeptic who questions why the
natural facts about what is good for a human being should concern or constrain her. Chapter five
completes the exposition of Foot’s account of natural normativity, arguing that the account does not
require a sharp distinction between moral and non-moral assessments of human conduct or character. The
final two chapters each address looming objections to natural normativity: Chapter six tackles the
objection that practical rationality consists in the pursuit of happiness rather than conformity to natural
norms of goodness and defect (or of virtue and vice), and chapter seven addresses the immoralist
objection that we can rationally reject such norms. The seven chapters of Natural Goodness seem to
divide into three stages: the preparatory argument for cognitivism, the central account of natural
normativity, and the response to the two objections. Though the final two chapters of Natural Goodness
address objections to the account of natural normativity, their interest lies less in Foot’s argumentative
rejoinders than in the astuteness of her several claims and observations about happiness and immoralism,
respectively. I will thus focus my remarks on the first two stages of the argument, commenting only
briefly at the end on the final two chapters.
I. Clearing the way for cognitivism
Under the broadest description, Foot’s project is to reveal the “logical category of evaluation” to which
specifically moral evaluation properly belongs. (p. 3) What does it mean to call an action good or just?
What is the conceptual structure of such moral evaluations? One cannot responsibly undertake to answer
these questions without recognizing the modern impetus for them in G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica and
the subsequent non-cognitivist responses that Moore’s intuitionism inspired. To gain a hearing for her
cognitivist view of natural normativity, Foot must begin by breaking with the now entrenched non-
cognitivist orthodoxy set in motion by A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson and maintained and revived by R.
M. Hare, John Mackie, Allan Gibbard, and Simon Blackburn.
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The swiftness of the initial moves in the introduction and first chapter of Natural Goodness will no
doubt leave Foot’s opening arguments unconvincing to many readers. Foot observes that the several
varieties of non-cognitivism that became prominent in twentieth-century ethical theory made a
reasonable attempt to account for an important feature of moral evaluation: its action-guidingness.
Moral evaluations do more than merely describe the way the world is; they move us to act (or at
least shape our motivational psychology). Certainly, any adequate moral theory must be able to
account for this commonplace. The mistake in the non-cognitivist approach, Foot argues, is in its
construal of action-guidingness as a kind of conative extra that is superadded to the descriptive
component of moral evaluations. If the action-guidingness of moral judgments is explained by the
agent’s attitude, feeling, or commitment to action—or, more generally, by some mental state—
moral judgments will have no necessary normative force, nor clear truth conditions. The normative
force of the moral judgment will only be present if the agent has the relevant mental state. And
because the moral judgment is tied only to a contingent state of the agent, it cannot properly be said
to be true or false. Foot argues that the distance between fact and value on the non-cognitivist
account leaves a justificatory gap between a moral judgment and its grounds. She writes, “Whatever
‘grounds’ may have been given, someone may be unready, indeed unable, to make the moral
judgment, because he has not got the attitude or feeling, is not in the ‘conative’ state of mind, is
not ready to take the decision to act. . . ” (p. 8) Non-cognitivism leaves the action-guidingness of
moral judgments untethered, floating free of any grounding in matters of fact. An agent could know
the relevant facts, but not be gripped or bound by the relevant moral judgment because she lacks the
appropriate mental state; conversely, an agent may be moved to act on a moral judgment, without
an appreciation of the facts that make her moral judgment appropriate or inappropriate.
Foot’s own answer to this predicament consists in the deceptively simple claim that “acting morally
is part of practical rationality.” (p. 9) Reconceiving the relationship between morality and practical
rationality, Foot argues, is necessary in order to preserve the insight that moral judgments are
action-guiding without opening the gap between a moral judgment and its grounds. Foot argues that
the primary concept is goodness of choice or acting well, a concept that cannot be reduced to either
an account of moral action or intention or of non-moral rationality. Focusing on the goodness of an
agent’s deliberative choice puts practical rationality and morality “on a par.” (p.11) Moral and non-
moral considerations may both provide reasons for acting, reasons that the virtuous agent takes into
account and weighs appropriately, resulting in good choice and—when intervening obstacles and
weakness of will are absent—good action. Foot suggests that this simple approach to practical
rationality has been forced out of view by philosophers who have tended to see practical rationality
as roughly synonymous with self-interest (or desire-satisfaction) and who have then worked to
show either that moral considerations coincide with self-interest (or conduce to desire-satisfaction)
or that all practical reasons are in the end moral. Either way, the fit seems forced: Sometimes the
morally right action comes at the cost of self-interest (or personal satisfaction), and some acts about
which we deliberate seem far removed from any moral matter. Foot’s maneuver here, though
refreshing, requires no great subtlety of thought: Instead of giving conceptual, justificatory, or
normative authority or primacy to a preconceived notion of either practical rationality or of
morality, then forcing the other concept into a fit with it, one acknowledges the diverse sources of
our reasons for acting and treats all of them as, at least prima facie, on a par. As Foot’s example of
the imprudently dallying burglar (or any reading of the “News of the Weird” column) shows, there
are a variety of ways to “contravene rationality.” (p. 14) The subtlety comes from Foot’s attempt to
link this newly leveled view of practical rationality with the action-guidingness of moral judgments.
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Goodness of choice—also called goodness of will—consists in reason-recognition and reason-
following. (p. 13) The virtuous agent is one who recognizes the various reasons for action, weighs
them appropriately, and is responsive to the determination of her deliberation, i.e., is motivated by
and acts in accord with her reasoning. Reason-recognition and reason-following enter the picture
hand-in-hand; an agent does not properly recognize reasons, whether moral or non-moral, unless
she recognizes the force these considerations have on her choice or will.
But how do moral reasons come by their normative force? How do we know when an agent
recognizes and acts on the right reasons? And what rules out the possibility of an agent’s being
perfectly rational by acting on the right reasons but in pursuit of a bad end? Invoking Anscombe’s
notion of “Aristotelian necessities” rather hastily, Foot argues that what an animal should do
depends on the kind of animal it is. The same holds for humans: What we should do depends upon
our being humans; right reasons are to be understood as derived from the facts of human life. Thus,
the action-guidingness of moral judgments is not separable from the facts at hand; moral evaluation
does not reside across an insuperable divide—facts on one side, values (qua mental states) on the
other.
As I have said, the introduction and first chapter of Natural Goodness are not likely to be terribly
convincing to those of the non-cognitivist persuasion or to those who have labored at making an
alternative conception of practical rationality viable (such as Gauthier or Hare); the arguments
simply move too quickly here. We want to know something further about just why the gap between
the moral judgment and its ground opens irreparably for non-cognitivists. For example, Gibbard’s
norm-expressivist account in his Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Harvard, 1992), which is a specific
target for Foot, purports not to leave the individual agent’s moral judgment entirely disconnected
from any further objective grounding. Indeed, like Foot, Gibbard, too, calls upon certain biological
facts about human life and social organization to put the agent’s own acceptance of moral norms
into a wider context. He argues for an empirical psychology and an evolutionary account of our
normative capacities. If such psychological and biological facts can provide a sufficiently firm
ground for moral judgments, relieving the worry that an agent’s moral judgment has no reach
beyond her own state of mind, then the gap, though it may still exist, is more difficult to descry. To
be sure, Gibbard’s norm-expressivism is at the end of the day still expressivist, relying upon a
picture of moral judgments as expressing the agent’s own commitment to certain norms (a mental
state). But then the difference between Gibbard’s grounding of moral norms in biological facts and
Foot’s grounding of moral judgments in natural facts appears to have more to do with the viability
of a certain picture of the mind and of psychology, i.e., with the nature of mental states, than with
the justification of moral judgments and their relationship to a wider context. Indeed, I suggest it is
ultimately the plausibility of this notion of mental states that must be called into question if non-
cognitivism is to be defeated. Alternately, the difference in the justificatory account that Foot offers
and that which Gibbard offers may depend largely on whether one sees Foot’s neo-teleological
explanation as satisfactory or Gibbard’s speculative psychology and evolutionary account as
satisfactory. Once again, the problem seems to be relocated outside of the traditional perimeter of
moral philosophy. Although I share Foot’s emphatic wish to lead moral philosophy away from non-
cognitivism, her opening pages in Natural Goodness fall far short of the argumentative detail
required to provide a satisfactory rejection of non-cognitivism. Nonetheless, her attempt to reclaim
the philosophical space needed to air a cognitivist moral theory is—perhaps in part because of its
spareness—illuminating. This is where a cognitivist alternative must begin, she suggests: with a
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leveled view of practical rationality that rejects the “hydraulic picture” of motivation that has for so
long seemed the only way to account for the action-guidingness of moral judgments. (p. 21)
Although only the outlines of the cognitivist account of practical rationality and motivation are
visible here, the structure is admirably clear. Moreover, to the extent that the opening moves in the
introduction and first chapter seem unsatisfactory, it must be remembered that their primary purpose
is to open the door to an account of moral judgments that does not depend upon the radical divide
between fact and value that has informed non-cognitivism since Moore. In this respect, Natural
Goodness continues a line of argument begun in Foot’s early papers (see for example “Moral
Beliefs,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59, 1958). Reading Foot’s newest book is edifying
in part because of the opportunity it affords to discern the revision and refinement in her thinking
but also the tenacity and inventiveness with which she continues to argue her position.
II. Natural normativity
Having moved past the obstacle of non-cognitivism by the end of the first chapter, Foot hopes to
have prepared the way for her alternative theory of natural normativity. She remarks,
“[I]t is obvious that there are objective, factual evaluations of such things as human sight,
hearing, memory, and concentration, based on the life form of our own species. Why, then,
does it seem so monstrous a suggestion that the evaluation of the human will should be
determined by facts about the nature of human beings and the life of our own species?” (p. 24)
By shining the light on natural normativity, Foot hopes to make the monster disappear.
Chapters two and three answer this challenge, arguing first that an updated teleology allows us to
derive norms for a living thing from facts about the species to which it belongs, and second, that
the same grounding of norms in natural facts applies to assessments of human conduct, and hence
to moral judgments. In making the first move, Foot draws heavily upon an essay titled “The
Representation of Life” by her former student Michael Thompson. (The essay is collected in the
festschrift in Foot’s honor Virtues and Reasons, edited by Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence,
and Warren Quinn [Clarendon, 1995].) She argues that we make judgments of the goodness and
defect of living things by reference to a teleological account of the life form of the species to which
the thing belongs. In assessing (to use her example) whether a particular peacock is defective if its
tail is not brightly colored, we ask what part having a brightly colored tail plays in the life cycle of
peacocks. If having a brightly colored tail plays a part in the life cycle of the species—if it has a
function—then a peacock that lacks a brightly colored tail is defective. Crucially, this defect is
more than a statistical anomaly; it is a normative failure, which can only be ascribed to the
individual by reference both to its species and to the teleology that structures the life cycle of that
species. Foot summarizes the view this way:
“We start from the fact that it is the particular life form of a species of plant or animal that
determines how an individual plant or animal should be. . .And all the truths about what this
or that characteristic does, what its purpose or point is, and in suitable cases its function, must
be related to this life cycle. The way an individual should be is determined by what is needed
for development, self-maintenance, and reproduction. . .” (p.33)
To evaluate an individual plant or animal, then, one depends upon knowledge of certain facts about
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the species to which the individual belongs and the teleological explanations of the characteristics of
the life cycle of that species. When it comes to evaluating the behavior or characteristics of plants
and animals, we need no special conative state, no commendation, no superadded feeling or state of
mind, no special endorsement. Moreover, the facts ground our evaluations directly, without any
reference to human interests or purposes.
Similarly, Foot believes, the very same conceptual structure applies to our moral evaluations; the
facts of human life ground our judgments of natural goodness and defect—of virtue and vice—in
human beings. There can be true and false moral judgments just as there can be true or false
evaluations of peacocks. The account of natural normativity underwrites Foot’s rejection of non-
cognitivism and makes sense of her leveling of practical rationality. Foot is fully aware that the
extension to human beings of the same conceptual structure of natural normativity, which allows us
to make judgments of the goodness or defect of plants and animals, will raise a few eyebrows. Yet
she is sanguine that the account of natural normativity does not founder when we make the
transition to human beings, rational animals who are capable of sizing up not only their group
norms but also their own individual prospects. Foot observes that
“there is so much diversity in human beings and human cultures that the schema of natural
normativity may seem to be inapplicable from the start. Nevertheless, for all the diversities of
human life, it is possible to give some quite general account of human necessities, that is, of
what is quite generally needed for human good, if only by starting from the negative idea of
human deprivation.” (p. 43)
She continues, noting that there are certain physical properties, mental capacities, and powers of
imagination without which human beings are deprived and naturally defective; they are not as they
should be. (p. 43)
However, it is important here to see just how very little really can be said, without substantial
controversy, on this “quite general account.” Foot overestimates the ease with which we can move
to unassailable normative claims from even the most basic facts about the physical capacities or
constitution of humans. Consider Foot’s own first specific suggestion about the physical properties
needed by human beings and without which their lives are deprived or defective: “There are for
instance physical properties such as the kind of larynx that allows of the myriad sounds that make
up human language, as well as the kind of hearing that can distinguish them.”(p. 43) Presumably,
the point about natural goodness and defect for human beings should be easiest to make with
respect to those things that are farthest removed from what we regard as morally or culturally
significant. In other words, if the schema of natural normativity works without serious complaint for
our assessments of plants and non-human animals (--and I won’t speak to this point here), it does
so in virtue of the fact that the animal lives, bodies, or behaviors we are assessing by reference to
species-given norms are fundamentally, if not wholly, biological and physical. The case of non-
human animals is not complicated by the overlay of culture. Accordingly, the schema of natural
normativity should be least controversial when its application to human goodness and defect is
limited to physical or biological properties. But even here the schema seems doubtful when applied
to humans. To take issue with Foot’s example (noted above), the debate within the deaf community
about the advisability of cochlear implants or other devices that “correct for” hearing impairment
should make us hesitate before accepting the claim that human beings who do not hear (or whose
larynxes are not suited to spoken language) are naturally defective. Deaf people are divided about
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whether to view themselves as deprived or defective, as subject to conditions that they would gladly
prevent, alleviate, or remedy as soon as new technologies prove workable.
Foot acknowledges that in the case of animals, physical properties that normally serve a species
well and play a part in the life cycle of the species by aiding in survival and reproduction can
sometimes work against an individual member of that species. (p. 34) Despite the fact that under
certain circumstances, what is normal for a species may prove disadvantageous to an individual (or
that what is abnormal may prove incidentally advantageous), the norm still holds. Thus, Foot argues
that the normal is indeed normative—it is more than a statistical measure of what is typical or usual
for the species; it sets a standard by which to assess individuals of the species. The trouble is that
human beings are not only the subjects of normative evaluation, but also the evaluators. Our
capacity for evaluation allows us to look upon our statistical irregularities or species-irregularities in
a wholly different light. For instance, humans may transform deafness from an alleged defect into a
rich culture and way of life with its own forms of goodness. Humans can do more than survive in
and adapt to their environment, they can alter their environment and their ways of living, through
culture, to fit them. If the account of natural normativity looks dubious when applied to matters of
human physical properties, it seems even less likely to succeed when applied to matters of moral
judgment or rational volition where the impact of human capacities for reason and evaluation is all
the more evident—and all the more subtle.
But perhaps there is yet some basic, “quite general” norm for human life, deviation from which
must count as defect? I suggest that whatever candidate descriptions or facts of human life are
presented for consideration, all will likely succumb to the same sort of trouble that the example
concerning deafness makes vivid. Humans are so remarkably resilient, capable of valuing so many
different ways of living, that most alleged defects will be found by some to be rich, perhaps
surprising, sources of deep value and goodness, generating particular virtues all their own. We are
the creators of our norms; we are not created by them.
Perhaps a helpful way to put the point is through an imaginative exercise. Imagine that you
someday succumb to a disease or suffer an accident, which substantially alters your capacities,
physical or otherwise—for instance, leaves you deaf, paralyzed, blind, or unable to speak. Most of
us, I suspect, no matter how bravely we might rally under the circumstances and fight to reclaim a
meaningful and valuable life despite the misfortune, would still see the alteration as a misfortune,
as something we wish had not happened. But this is because we see our life stories as aiming at
certain ends or virtues or goods which were determined by our capacities before the unfortunate
accident or illness; naturally, afterward, we may see our new state as one of deprivation, even
defect. However, it is crucial that, both individually and collectively, we do not necessarily view
the new condition as one of defect or deprivation. Whether we do see ourselves as defective or
deprived will have much to do with our individual capacity or opportunity for re-valuing ourselves
and with whether our communities are structured to accommodate and incorporate us. We must
recognize that just as we make value and meaning and goodness given the capacities that we
actually have, those humans whose capacities are different make values and meaning and goodness
in light of them. The hearing teenager who loses her hearing may (or may not) see herself as newly
deprived, as sadly defective. But the person deaf from birth need not see herself this way. If it is
not too tortuous, the point might be put this way: A hearing person can reject the counterfactual
that he would have preferred to have been born deaf even as the deaf person may sensibly reject the
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counterfactual that she would have preferred to have been a hearing person. What I mean to suggest
is only that Foot’s account of natural normativity underestimates the way in which the individual
and social facts about humans (not the biological and species-wide facts) play the determining role
in most, if not all, our normative assessments of defect and deprivation. And even if the account
succeeds in providing a foothold in the normative at a “quite general” level, this hardly seems to
take us all the way to moral virtue and vice; the account will be so thin that it will yield no specific
normative guidance commensurate with moral evaluations. It is, after all, this rich and specific form
of moral evaluation, exemplified in the moral judgments of individuals, that the account of natural
normativity was designed to explain. In fact, it has often been noted that the special virtue of virtue
ethics is the “thick” character of the ethical assessments it offers. But natural normativity, in tying
the normative to biological facts—facts about the species—loses precisely this thickness, the way in
which moral judgments provide real, concrete guidance and yet are grounded in facts about what
constitutes flourishing in a particular community.
As I noted at the outset, the final two chapters of Natural Goodness address outstanding objections
to the account of natural normativity. Chapter six is clearly motivated by the need to rebut a
utilitarian objection to the effect that practical rationality consists in the pursuit of happiness. But
the discussion is obviously also in keeping with Foot’s neo-Aristotelianism, and not surprisingly,
she develops a fitting notion of happiness as flourishing. Foot concludes with the observation that
“happiness is a protean concept, appearing now in one way and now in another.” (p. 97) Most
enjoyable about this chapter are Foot’s descriptions of the various appearances of happiness. It is
perhaps surprising that Foot disagrees with McDowell about whether virtue and happiness can
conflict. Whereas McDowell argues that the virtuous agent who must sacrifice for the sake of virtue
will not feel the sacrifice as such and will not see herself as relinquishing her own happiness, but
rather as sustaining her happiness through the exercise of virtue, Foot believes this leaves too little
room for “genuine tragedy.” (p.97) Natural normativity, though it determines what is good for
human beings, does not guarantee that we can achieve it.
Chapter seven valiantly takes up Nietzsche’s challenge, his attack on morality and its premises. As
in her discussion of happiness, Foot’s remarks are insightful and valuable, quite independent of
their relationship to the account of natural normativity. But it must be said that Foot walks a fine
line here between unmasking Nietzsche’s sometimes hyperbolic rhetoric and stylistic excess to
reveal a camouflaged argument, which can be rationally analyzed, and dismissing his remarks as
mere posturing and dissembling, ultimately bearing no fruit. The discussion strikes me as eminently
sensible, though I can also see how one might find it deflationary or even flat. The task is to show
that even though humans have the capacity for abstract thought that allows us to engage in a project
of revaluation such as that recommended by Nietzsche, we are nonetheless limited by the life form
of our species; to be supermen would require us to be a different species. Ultimately, whether one
sees Foot’s response to Nietzsche as a successful defense of her own position will depend in part on
how one reads Nietzsche and whether one thinks there are further resources available to sustain the
position of the Nietzschean immoralist. If the final two chapters of the book seem to offer less by
way of argument and more by way of reflection and quiet insight, the one-page postscript that closes
the book ends on a decidedly quietist note. Foot observes that with respect to “substantial moral
questions,” “in a way nothing is settled, but everything is left as it was.” (p. 116) Some may well
think this could be the motto for moral philosophy. Even so, Natural Goodness is an illuminating
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